Federal Estate Tax Apportionment by Potysman, Gail D.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 3 Child Abuse Symposium Article 13
January 1978
Federal Estate Tax Apportionment
Gail D. Potysman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gail D. Potysman, Federal Estate Tax Apportionment , 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 943 (1978).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol54/iss3/13
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
The federal estate tax' has created myriad problems for the judi-
cial system. One major problem has been apportionment of the ulti-
mate burden of the tax2 among those "persons interested in the
estate.''3 Congress has directed that the executor of the estate is prima-
rily responsible for paying the federal estate tax 4 and that he is entitled
to recover the tax generated by proceeds of certain insurance policies
and funds over which the decedent had a general power of appoint-
ment, from the distributees of those assets.5 However, state laws deter-
mine from whom the executor should recover for taxes attributable to
other property included in the gross estate of the decedent.6
There are two basic theories concerning where the ultimate impact
of an estate tax should fall in the absence of contrary directions by a
decedent.7 The burden must either: (1) fall entirely on the residuary
estate;8 or (2) be divided among some of the interested persons in pro-
portion to the value of their share of the estate. The first theory is com-
monly referred to as the "burden on the residue" rule;9 and the latter is
identified as the "equitable apportionment" or "equitable contribu-
tion" rule.' 0
This note will examine the application of these two theories and
the variations which have been developed to overcome the inequities
1. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2209.
2. Apportionment of state-imposed estate and inheritance taxes will not be considered in
this note. Therefore, "the tax" and "estate tax" hereinafter refer to federal estate tax.
3. "Persons interested in the estate" means any person entitled to receive or who has re-
ceived from a decedent or by reason of the death of a decedent any property or interest therein
included in the estate. It includes a personal representative, guardian and trustee. 8 Uniform Laws
Annotated (Master Edition) § l(c) (1958) (Revised in 1964).
4. I.R.C. § 2002. (However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can proceed personally
against the transferees of the estate assets.) I.R.C. §§ 6901, 6324; (or through liens against the
assets) I.R.C. §§ 6321-25.
5. I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207.
6. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
7. See Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 II. 2d 525, 532-33, 372 N.E.2d 662, 665 (1978). Further
discussion on the topic of construction and effect of provisions of wills and non-testamentary
instruments as affecting the burden of apportioning the estate tax is beyond the scope of this note.
See general, Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 691 (1976), Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 630 (1976), Annot., 69
A.L.R.3d 122 (1976).
8. "Residuary estate" means that which remains in the probate estate after debts and ex-
penses of administration and legacies and devises have been satisfied. See Foerster v. Foerster, 54
Ohio Op. 441, 447, 122 N.E.2d 314, 322 (1954).
9. See In re Estate of Joas, 16 Wis. 2d 489, 114 N.W.2d 831 (1962).
10. See In re Estate of Van Duser, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1974).
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resulting from strict adherence to them. I I Although the majority of
states have enacted legislation concerning the ultimate payment of the
federal estate tax, 12 some states still leave the question to the discretion
of the state judiciary. 13 Judicial discretion in this area has resulted in
diverse problems.14 This note will provide examples of these problems
and suggestions for avoiding similar problems by adopting the "better
approach" for apportionment of the federal estate tax.' 5
COMPLEXITIES OF APPORTIONMENT
The complexities involved in apportionment of taxes become ap-
parent upon examination of various methods of distributing the ulti-
mate tax burden. For purposes of analysis, the estate 16 of a decedent
can be divided into three distinct parts: (1) assets not subject to probate,
(2) assets transferred by specific or general bequests, and (3) other as-
sets (the residue).17 Strict application of the equitable apportionment
rule requires distribution of the taxes proportionately among all three
II. See In re Estate of Garcia, 9 Ariz. App. 587, 455 P.2d 269 (1969).
12. ALA. CODE tit. 40, § 40-15-18 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 63-150 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-400 (1958);
DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 2901 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 733.817 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 236 A-I
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 29-2-12-1 (1976); IOWA CODE §
633.436 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2431 (West 1974); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § II-
109 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65A, § 5 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 720.11
(1968); MINN. STAT. § 524.3-916 (1975); MONT. REV. PROB. CODE ANN. § 91A-3-916 (1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 150.290 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88-A
(1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 25-30 (1953); N.M. PROB. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3-916 (1975); N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16 (1976);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.303 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701
(1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-23.1-1 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 12-15-1550 (1976); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 29-7 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1955); UTAH UNIFORM PROB. CODE
ANN. § 75-3-916 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7301 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 64.1-160 (1973);
W. VA. CODE § 44-2-16a (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977).
13. In re Estate of Garcia, 9 Ariz. App. 587, 455 P.2d 269 (1969); Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354
P.2d 513 (Colo. 1960); Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 21 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 1942);
Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 11. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144
Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); Louisville Trust Co. v. Waiter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948);
Bragdon v. Worthley, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959) (Maine repealed its total apportionment statute in
1949); Banks v. Junk, 264 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1972); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267
S.W.2d 632 (1954); Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963); McDougall v.
Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Sinnott v. Gidney, 159
Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d
1078 (1949); In re Estate of Joas, 16 Wis. 2d 489, 114 N.W.2d 831 (1962).
14. See text accompanying notes 110-36 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 137-50 infra.
16. The term "estate" throughout this note refers to the gross estate of a decedent as deter-
mined for the purpose of federal estate tax, unless preceded by a limiting term or phrase which
would require a different definition such as "probate estate."
17. In the case of an intestate decedent the estate consists of only two parts: (1) assets not
subject to probate and (2) assets passing by the laws of intestacy. The latter "part" of the estate is
the residue.
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"parts" of the estate, while the burden on the residue rule requires all
of the taxes be paid out of the residuary (the third "part") alone.' 8 An
alternative to the strict equitable apportionment rule is that the taxes
generated by specific and general bequests are apportioned among the
respective beneficiaries and the residuary is charged with the remaining
taxes.19 Another "limited" method of equitable apportionment charges
the recipients of nonprobate assets with the portion of taxes generated
by their part of the estate and charges the residuary with the rest of the
taxes.20
Further complications can arise because of the type of beneficiary.
For instance, when the estate contains either an inter vivos or testamen-
tary trust, the method which is selected must provide for apportion-
ment among the life tenants, income beneficiaries, and the
remaindermen or among only some of these recipients.2' Moreover, a
provision must be made for the method for apportioning the taxes
when the beneficiary is the surviving spouse, a minor child of the dece-
dent, or a charitable institution.
The estate is allowed a limited deduction for a transfer to the sur-
viving spouse,22 and to certain minor children,23 and also for the value
of property transferred to certain public, charitable and religious insti-
tutions.24 Strict application of the equitable contribution rule would
require each of these beneficiaries to contribute that proportion of the
tax which the value of their transfer bears to the taxable estate. 25 This
method distributes the benefit for each deduction over the entire estate
rather than entirely to the spouse, child or charitable institution.26 The
burden on the residue rule places the entire burden of the taxes on the
residue whether the residuary beneficiary is the surviving spouse or
child, or a charitable institution.27 On the other hand, these transferees
18. See, e.g., Stoner v. Custer, 252 Ind. 662, 251 N.E.2d 668 (1969) (apportionment); ALA.
CODE tit. 40, § 40-15-18 (1975) (residue).
19. Apportionment between specific legatees and residuary beneficiaries is merely a possibil-
ity. No state has actually adopted this method of apportionment.
20. Penny v. Commissioner, 504 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio law).
21. See National Newark & Essex Bank v. Hart, 309 A.2d 512 (Me. 1973). Income benefi-
ciaries have never been charged with a portion of the estate tax. However, the argument has
frequently been made that they should share in the taxes. See generally, Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 273
(1975).
22. I.R.C. § 2056.
23. I.R.C. § 2057 (This section was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976).
24. I.R.C. § 2055.
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Glover, 45 Haw. 569, 371 P.2d 361 (1962); Hampton's Adm'rs v.
Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920); Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798
(1963).
26. See Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), a fd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
27. See, e.g., Herson v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1963) (applying District of Colum-
bia law); In re Uihlien's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1952).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
could be required to contribute toward the taxes only to the extent that
their share of the estate exceeds the allowable deduction. 28
Each of the states has had to struggle with these complexities. The
majority of states have enacted comprehensive legislation pertaining to
distribution of the tax burden.29 The recent trend among the states,
both legislatively and judicially, seems to be in the direction of appor-
tionment among those "persons interested in the estate."' 30 Once again
the United States takes one giant leap forward only to wind up right
where it started.31
HISTORY OF APPORTIONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The earliest decision directing which funds should be charged with
the estate tax was rendered by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
1918 in Fuller v. Gale.32 The testatrix, Isabel J. Gale, neglected to in-
clude in her will directions for the payment of the federal estate tax.
The court asserted that "the estate tax is not a property tax but one
upon the transfer of the net estate."' 33 Without any further explanation
the court determined that the taxes should be paid out of the estate but
ultimately should be charged pro rata to each beneficiary.
The following year the New York Court of Appeals adopted the
28. Cf. Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961) (equitable apportionment only to
the extent their share exceeds the marital deduction); Spurrier v. First Nat'l Bank, 207 Kan. 406,
485 P.2d 209 (1971) (burden on residue only if share exceeds allowable deduction under Internal
Revenue Code § 2056).
29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (West 1956); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 12-400 (1958); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 2901 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 733.817 (Supp. 1978);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 236 A-I (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 29-2-12-1
(1976); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65A, § 5
(West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 720.11 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 524.3-916 (1975); MONT.
REV. PROB. CODE ANN. § 91A-3-916 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 150.290 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88-A (1970); N.M. PROB. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3-916
(1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-
16 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.303 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
44-23.1-1 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1955); UTAH UNIFORM PROB. CODE ANN. §
75-3-916 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7301 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 64.1-160 (1973); W. VA.
CODE § 44-2-16a (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977). Many states with legislation concerning
apportionment have been omitted because some of the considerations discussed above are not
answered in those statutes. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1971) (no provision for apportion-
ment when bequest is to a charitable institution); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-7 (1976) (no
provision for apportionment between income beneficiary and remaindermen).
30. See Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).
3 1. The first case to consider the issue of estate tax apportionment was Fuller v. Gale, 78
N.H. 554, 103 A. 308 (1918). (The estate tax was apportioned among all the beneficiaries.) Then
the burden on the residue rule was applied consistently until 1942 in almost all jurisdictions.
(See text accompanying notes 34-59 infra.) Now the majority of jurisdictions apply equitable
apportionment.
32. 78 N.H. 544, 103 A. 308 (1918).
33. Id. at 546, 103 A. at 309.
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opposite view in In re Hamlin.34 There, the court determined that in
the absence of instruction from a decedent, the federal estate tax must
be paid out of the residue of the estate. The testatrix in that case specifi-
cally bequeathed property to one of her daughters and to nine other
individuals. The remainder of her estate was to be held in trust for the
benefit of her other daughter and grandson. The executor deducted
from each specific legacy the amount of taxes generated by inclusion of
such property in the estate. The court determined that the action taken
by the executor was incorrect and that the estate taxes should be borne
by the residuary alone. The reason given by the court for this result was
that Congress had implied that the residuary be charged with all of the
estate taxes. 35
In reaching this decision, the court traced the statutory history of
death taxes. In doing so, the court contrasted the federal estate tax with
its predecessor "inheritance tax" which was adopted by Congress in the
1898 War Revenue Laws.36 Among the various revenue raising taxes
was one on "legacies and distributive shares of personal property. '37
This inheritance tax was imposed on any transfer of personal property
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the transferor's
death. 38 The amount of tax was determined by the legal relationship of
the transferor to the transferee and the value or amount of property
transferred to each beneficiary. 39 In 1901, this section of the Act was
amended to provide that the executors and administrators should re-
duce each particular legacy or distributive share by the amount attrib-
uted to each transfer.4° The tax on legacies and distributive shares was
repealed in 190241 and in 1916 Congress adopted the federal estate
tax.42 The amount of federal estate tax is not determined by the legal
relationship between the decedent and the transferee nor by the
amount of each separate distribution. The estate tax is based on the net
value of the estate. In 1919, the estate tax law was amended to provide
that beneficiaries of life insurance policies should be charged with the
taxes attributable to the insurance proceeds.43 However, this was the
only provision relating to apportionment of the estate tax burden.44
34. 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919).
35. Id. at 418, 124 N.E. at 7.




40. War Revenue Laws of 1898, ch. 806, § 30, 31 Stat. 948 (1901).
41. Act to Repeal War-Revenue Taxation, ch. 500, § 8, 32 Stat. 97-98 (1902).
42. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 777-80 (now I.R.C. §§ 2001-2209).
43. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 408, 40 Stat. 1096 (now I.R.C. § 2206).
44. In 1942 the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was amended to provide that recipients of
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After reviewing these statutory developments, the court in Hamlin
reasoned that since Congress had not adopted an "inheritance tax"
statute similar to the one contained in the War Revenue Laws, it had
intended the burden of the taxes fall on the residuary rather than on
each recipient. The court also inferred that since Congress did not di-
rect apportionment, it had intended the opposite result.45 Many other
jurisdictions followed Hamlin by placing the burden on the residuary
of the estate. 46 The primary justification for adopting the "burden on
the residue" rule for the next two decades was that Congress had in-
tended such a result.47
The burden on the residue rule was applied in its strictest form
during this period. Therefore, even if the property received by the re-
siduary beneficiary did not generate any tax, because of a deduction
applying to such property,48 the burden still fell on the residuary.49 In
Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis,50 the Ohio Supreme Court
contrasted the federal "inheritance tax" with the federal estate tax and,
as the New York court had in Hamlin, inferred that Congress had con-
templated that the residuary would be charged unless the decedent di-
rected otherwise. In this case the decedent made various specific
bequests in her will and then provided for the remainder of the estate
to be paid to various charitable institutions. The court primarily relied
on those sections of the Internal Revenue Code which provide that the
taxes should be paid by the executor 5' and that "as far as is practicable
: * * the tax [should] be paid out of the estate before its distribution" 52
in concluding that the charitable remainder should be charged with all
of the estate tax.
On appeal, the result was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court,53 but based upon different reasoning. The only question
presented to the Court was whether the charity was being deprived of a
federal right of exemption from such taxes on charitable gifts 54 when
property subject to a power of appointment should also be charged with their proportionate share
of the tax. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 826(d), 56 Stat. 943 (now I.R.C. § 2207).
45. In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 419, 124 N.E. 4, 7 (1919).
46. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); Plunkett v. Old
Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919).
47. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919). See also
text accompanying notes 35-45 supra.
48. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1098 (now I.R.C. § 2055).
49. See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
50. 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
51. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 407, 40 Stat. 1096 (now I.R.C. § 2002). "The tax imposed
by this chapter shall be paid by the executor."
52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 408, 40 Stat. 1096 (now I.R.C. § 2205).
53. Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924), ajf'g 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922).
54. I.R.C. § 2055.
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the Ohio Supreme Court directed that the estate tax be paid out of the
charitable residuum. The Court emphasized that nothing in the Code
precluded a charitable residuary beneficiary from paying all of the tax
even though that part of the estate transferred to the charity did not
generate any of the tax. The Court ruled only on the issue presented
and did not, at this time, explain whether federal or state law controlled
which "persons interested in the estate" should be burdened with the
taxes.
The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Hamlin interpre-
tation of the Code in In re Del Drago's Estate.55 That court was con-
fronted with a question concerning the constitutionality of a New York
statute which apportioned the federal estate taxes among the benefi-
ciaries.56 The court concluded that:
[TInsofar as the [statute] requires or directs distribution and appor-
tionment of the Federal estate taxes levied and to be levied upon the
estate of the deceased among the legatees, they are repugnant to the
provisions of the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1926 and amendments
thereto, the Congress being competent to legislate on the subject of
estate excises, and to the uniformity and supremacy clauses of the
Federal Constitution and are, therefore, unconstitutional. 57
The Del Drago court agreed with the reasoning in Hamlin, but added
that Congress had more than implied that the taxes should be charged
to the residuary of the estate. The court stated that "Section 826(b)5 8 of
the Code leaves no doubt that it was the purpose and intent of Con-
gress to exclude specific legatees, as such, from bearing any of the bur-
den of the tax."59
Nonetheless, Del Drago was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court in Riggs v. Del Drago .60 The Court denied that section
55. 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.2d 131 (1941), rev'd, Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
56. N.Y. DECEDENTS EST. LAW. ch. 709, § 124 (1930) (re-enacted as N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKimney 1967)).
57. 287 N.Y. at 79, 38 N.E.2d at 140.
58. Section 826(b) provides:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of that part of the estate passing
to or in the possession of, any person other than the executor in his capacity as such, such
person shall be entitled to reimbursement out of any part of the estate still undistributed
or by a just and equitable contribution by the persons whose interest in the estate of the
decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been paid before the distribution of the
estate or whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes,
debts, or other charges against the estate, it being the purpose and intent of this sub-
chapter that so far as is practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the
decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 826(b), 56 Stat. 943 (now I.R.C. § 2205).
59. 287 N.Y. at 64, 38 N.E.2d at 135 (footnote added).
60. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
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826(b) of the Code61 should be interpreted as placing the burden on the
residue of the estate.62 The Court explained that Congress only in-
tended that "if the tax must be collected after distribution, the final
impact of the tax should be the same as though it had been taken out of
the estate before distribution. '63
The Court also rejected the theory that section 826(C) 64 and
826(d) 65 providing for contribution from recipients of life insurance
proceeds and distributees of property subject to a power of appoint-
ment, should be interpreted as forbidding further apportionment
among other distributees. 66 The Court concluded that state law should
determine what part of the estate would ultimately be charged with the
burden because "Congress did not contemplate that the Government
would be interested in the distribution of the estate after the tax was
paid .... ",67
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Riggs case, thirty-six
states have adopted statutes directing the method for distributing fed-
eral estate taxes. Three of these states, Alabama, Iowa and Oklahoma
68
follow the "burden on the residue" rule. The other thirty-three states
require that the taxes be apportioned among some or all of the distribu-
tees.69 Fourteen states have left the method of distributing the tax bur-
den to the discretion of the judiciary.70
61. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 826(b), 56 Stat. 943 (now I.R.C. § 2205). See note 58
supra .
62. 317 U.S. at 100-01.
63. Id. at 101.
64. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 826(c), 56 Stat. 943 (now I.R.C. § 2206).
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 826(d), 56 Stat. 943 (now I.R.C. § 2207).
66. 317 U.S. at 95.
67. Id. at 98.
68. ALA. CODE tit. 40 § 40-15-18 (1975); IOWA CODE § 633.436 (1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §
3 (1970). (Whether this statute should actually be applied in determining who actually bears the
tax burden is questionable. See text accompanying notes 87-91 infra.)
69. ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE §
970 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-400 (1958); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 2901 (1974); FLA. STAT.
§ 733.817 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 236 A-I (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1978);
IND. CODE § 29-2-12-1 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2431 (West 1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65A, § 5 (West Supp. 1978); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 720.11 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 524.3-916 (1975); MONT. REV. PROB. CODE ANN. §
91A-3-916 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 150.290 (1973); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 88-A (1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 25-30 (1953); N.M. PROB. STAT. ANN. §
32A-3-916 (1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-20-16 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.303 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (1975);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-23.1-1 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 12-15-1550 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 29-7 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1955); UTAH UNIFORM PROB. CODE ANN. § 75-
3-916 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7301 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 64.1-160 (1973); W. VA.
CODE § 44-2-16a (1966); WVyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977).
70. In re Estate of Garcia, 9 Ariz. App. 587, 455 P.2d 269 (1969); Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354
P.2d 513 (Colo. 1960); Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 21 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 1942);
Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 II. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144
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BURDEN ON THE RESIDUE VERSUS EQUITABLE
APPORTIONMENT: ANALYSIS
Of the fourteen states where the distribution issue has been left up
to the state judiciary, the highest court in six of those states has de-
clared that the rule of burden on the residue should be applied.7' In the
remaining eight states, the equitable apportionment rule has been cho-
sen by the judiciary. 72
The Burden on the Residue Approach
Use of the "burden on the residue" rule is justified most often by
three lines of reasoning: (1) the difference between the estate tax and an
"inheritance tax;" (2) the similarity between the estate tax and adminis-
tration expenses; and (3) the intent of the decedent would best be ac-
complished by this rule.
The first line of reasoning involving the difference between estate
and inheritance tax, is based on the fact that the federal estate tax is
levied on the transfer of a person's property at his death. It is not a tax
on the property itself nor on the privilege of an heir or beneficiary to
receive the property. 73 Consequently, the tax should not be paid by the
individual recipients of the estate. Generally, this line of reasoning is
supported by contrasting an inheritance tax with an estate tax.74 The
former is a tax on the right to receive property, the latter on the right to
transfer property. However, proponents of this line of reasoning ignore
the fact that both are taxes involving the same property. The basic dif-
ference between these two taxes is that an inheritance tax rate is gener-
Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948);
Bragdon v. Worthey, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959) (Maine repealed their total apportionment statute
in 1949); Banks v. Junk, 264 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1972); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267
S.W.2d 632 (1954); Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963); McDougall v.
Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Sinnott v. Gidney, 159
Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d
1078 (1949); In re Estate of Joas, 16 Wis. 2d 489, 114 N.W.2d 831 (1962).
71. Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354 P.2d 513 (Colo. 1960); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan.
79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); Banks v. Junk, 264 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1972); Sinnott v. Gidney, 159 Tex.
366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d
1078 (1949); In re Estate of Joas, 16 Wis. 2d 489, 114 N.W.2d 831 (1962).
72. In re Estate of Garcia, 9 Ariz. App. 587, 455 P.2d 269 (1969); Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Ga. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 21 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 1942); Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372
N.E.2d 662 (1978); Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948); Bragdon v.
Worthley, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959) (Maine repealed their total apportionment statute in 1949);
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954); Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363,
128 S.E.2d 798 (1963); McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104
N.E.2d 441 (1952).
73. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fairchild, 21 Ill. App. 3d 459, 461, 315 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1974).
74. Id., 315 N.E.2d at 660.
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ally based on the relationship of the recipient to the decedent, 75
whereas an estate tax is based on the size of the whole estate. 76 This
difference is merely a matter of the form in which the tax tables are set
up and does not inherently determine what part of the estate should
ultimately be burdened with the estate tax.
The courts which apply this line of reasoning as a justification for
placing the burden on the residuary fail to appreciate that a tax com-
puted by reference to the whole estate is more "readily administered
with less conflict than a tax based upon shares. ' 77 An estate tax also
"prevents the federal government from going into the courts contesting
and construing wills and statutes of distribution. ' 78 In other words, the
estate tax was chosen over an inheritance tax because the former is so
much easier to calculate and collect.
Second, many of those jurisdictions which propound the difference
between the federal estate tax and an inheritance tax suggest that the
federal estate tax liability is comparable to funeral expenses and ad-
ministration expenses. 79 In Illinois, 80 for example, many decisions have
stated that the "nature" of the federal estate tax is different from the
"nature" of the state inheritance tax but that the "priority and status"
of the federal estate tax liability is the same as that of funeral expenses
and administrative expenses. 81 These propositions are logically incon-
sistent.
The Illinois Probate Act 82 establishes that funeral expenses are a
first priority claim against the estate and that federal estate taxes are a
third class claim. 83 If these two liabilities can be called "equal" then
surely the state inheritance tax, a sixth priority claim,84 is also "equal"
to the federal estate tax. In one sense the Illinois courts seem to be
saying that the state legislature intended inheritance taxes and federal
estate taxes to be treated differently and intended administrative ex-
penses and federal estate taxes to be treated similarly. However, no-
where in the Probate Act are administrative expenses and estate taxes
75. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 375 (1975).
76. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
77. In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 415, 124 N.E. 4, 6 (1919) (Quoting a passage from the report
of the Committee on Ways and Means.)
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fairchild, 21 11. App. 3d 459, 315 N.E.2d 658 (1974).
80. Illinois was generally considered a "burden on the residue" state prior to 1974 when In
re Estate of Van Duser, 19 Il. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1974) was decided.
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 42 Ill. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344 (1976).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 1-1 to 30-3 (1975) (amended 1976).
83. Id. at § 18-10.
84. Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
referred to without an additional reference to inheritance taxes.85
Moreover, there is a long established rule of statutory construction that
when two phrases are used in the same statute each phrase is to be
given an independent meaning, because the legislature does not intend
to be merely repetitious. 86
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Tapp v. Mitchell,87 used a simi-
lar line of reasoning in deciding that only the residuary should be
charged with the taxes. They stated that the statute directing "payment
of debts"88 controlled because the estate tax was a debt of the estate.
However, the statute does not explicitly refer to estate taxes and in most
states "debts" are not treated as including federal estate taxes.8 9 In
those states where the legislature has directed how the estate taxes
should be apportioned,9° the legislature has also enacted a statute simi-
lar to the one used in Tapp, directing the order for abatement of prop-
erty for the payment of debts.9'
Finally, the supporters of the "burden on the residuary" rule rea-
son that when the residuary is sufficient to defray the cost of the taxes,
there is a presumption that by specifically providing for certain individ-
uals in a testamentary instrument, or by transferring property inter
vivos, the transferor has manifested an intent that such gifts not be re-
duced by apportioning estate taxes to the recipients.92 This argument is
inherently lacking in the case of an intestate decedent if there is non-
probate property included in the gross estate. All state legislatures have
enacted statutes of descent and distribution which apply to the probate
estates of intestate decedents.93 These statutes are designed to represent
the presumed intent of the decedent. The property generally passes to
those relatives in the order of the proximity of their relationship to the
decedent.94 The legislators have expressed the belief that the decedent
wants his property to pass to his closest relatives. If this were not true
the decedent would have prepared a will evidencing such an intent. It
seems inconsistent that the same legislature would charge the residuary
with all of the federal estate taxes since in many cases the "remainder"
85. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 at §§ 18-14, 19-1.
86. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955).
87. 352 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1960).
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1951).
89. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wahlin, 505 S.w.2d 99, 105 (Mo. App. 1973).
90. See note 69 supra.
91. Eg., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-1.3(c)-(d) (1966) (amended 1973 to in-
clude § 13-1.3(d)).
92. See In re Estate of Penny, 504 F.2d 37, 40 (6th Cir. 1974).
93. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1 (1977).
94. Id.
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of the estate is left to a close relative.95
The Equitable Apportionment Approach
The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the "equitable appor-
tionment" rule.96 The "equitable apportionment" rule is based on one
principle line of reasoning, the maxim of "equality is equity. ' 97 That is,
equity dictates that those who receive property which has been in-
cluded in the computation of federal estate taxes should share prorat-
ably in the payment of those taxes.98 This proposition follows from the
assumption that when a decedent does not direct to the contrary, he
intends for all beneficiaries to share in the tax burden.99 The testator
could easily direct which recipients should bear the burden of the taxes;
or conversely, which shares should not be diminished by the taxes lev-
ied against the estate.'°0
In addition, where the value of the nonresiduary estate' 0 ' is great,
the federal estate tax may equal or surpass the value of the residuary
estate. In the case of an intestate decedent, nonapportionment could
mean that the heirs at law would receive virtually nothing. 02 More-
over, nonapportionment could result in additional inequities to the
95. E.g., Park v. Carroll, 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d 40 (1973); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078 (1949).
96. ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE §
970 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-400 (1958); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 2901 (1974); FLA. STAT.
§ 733.817 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 236 A-I (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1978);
IND. CODE § 29-2-12-1 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2431 (West 1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. 11-109 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65A, § 5 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 720.11 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 524.3-916 (1975); MONT. REV. PROB. CODE ANN. § 91A-3-
916 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 150.290 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 88-A (1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 25-30 (1953); N.M. PROB. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3-
916 (1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-20-16 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.303 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 44-23.1-1 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 12-15-1550 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-
7 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1955); UTAH UNIFORM PROB. CODE ANN. § 75-3-916
(1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7301 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 64.1-160 (1973); W. VA. CODE §
44-2-16a (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977). See, e.g., Inre Estate of Garcia, 9 Ariz. App. 587,
455 P.2d 269 (1969); Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 21 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 1942);
Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 I11. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978); Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306
Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948); Bragdon v. Worthley, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959) (Maine repealed
their total apportionment statute in 1949); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632
(1954); Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963); McDougall v. Central Nat'l
Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
97. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136, 155, 96 N.E.2d
918, 927 (1951).
98. In re Estate of Van Duser, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 313 N.E.2d 228, 230-31 (1974).
99. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918
(1951).
100. See Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).
101. The "nonresiduary" estate includes both nonprobate assets and specific devises and
bequests.
102. Cf. In re Gato's Estate, 276 A. D. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1950), aifl'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93
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heirs at law. For instance, consider a case wherein an intestate dece-
dent, prior to death, held an interest in joint tenancy property with
someone other than a relative. The value of the decedent's interest in
the joint tenancy property is included in the estate for estate tax pur-
poses. 0 3 The tax generated by the inclusion of this property is then
paid by the executor out of the probate assets. Thus, the amount the
heirs at law could have received is reduced. If the surviving joint tenant
were to die within the next two years, then the tax on his estate would
be credited with the amount of tax paid on the "prior transfer." 0 4 Con-
sequently this results in the anomaly of the first decedent's family pay-
ing the tax for a stranger's'0 5 estate. This example should not be
interpreted as a suggestion that the Congress intended for the estate tax
to be distributed among the various distributees. Rather, this is another
illustration where placing the burden on the residue could result in a
gross inequity.
A decedent does have the right to specify what part of the estate
shall bear the burden'0 6 and therefore can avoid these inequities if he
so desires. The problem arises, in states without explicit statutes, when
the decedent has failed to draw up a will 0 7 or when testamentary lan-
guage directing payment is found to be insufficient. 0 8 An executor or
representative cannot know where to apportion the taxes if the courts in
one case "equitably apportion" the taxes and then later place the "bur-
den on the residuary."'' 9
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN STATES
WITHOUT EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION
Although the supreme court of a state could set forth a rule regard-
ing apportionment in terms that would cover every possible factual sit-
uation, this is essentially the function of the legislature. The problem
N.E.2d 924 (1950). (Probate estate consisted of $180,571 in assets, nonprobate estate consisted of
$528,973, and the federal estate tax was $190,532.)
103. I.R.C. § 2040.
104. I.R.C. § 2013. (The credit is allowed for up to 10 years after the transfer; after two years
the amount of the credit is reduced by 10% each year until the eleventh year when the credit is
zero.)
105. "Stranger" is defined as a person who was not related (by law or blood) to the decedent
at death.
106. See In re Wheeler's Estate, 65 Ill. App. 2d 201, 213 N.E.2d 35 (1965).
107. Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 42 Ill. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344, rev'd, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372
N.E.2d 662 (1978).
108. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943).
109. This was the case in Illinois. Compare In re Estate of Van Duser, 19 II. App. 3d 1022,
313 N.E.2d 228 (1974) with Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 42 IUl. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344, rev'd, 69
Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).
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that many courts have faced is that the state supreme court decisions
have not covered all of the various factual situations which may arise.
Missouri
Missouri is an example of a state that has encountered this prob-
lem. In Carpenter v. Carpenter,"° the Missouri Supreme Court was
faced with the choice of apportioning taxes between the nonprobate
property and the residuary estate or burdening only the residuary with
the taxes. The testator directed in his will that all bequests and devises
should be free and clear from any charges, including federal estate
taxes. The majority of the nonprobate property (an annuity and jointly
owned bonds) passed to the decedent's wife. The residue of the estate
was left in equal proportions to the spouse and the decedent's sons.
The issue presented in Carpenter was whether the recipients of the
nonprobate property should contribute proportionately in the payment
of the estate tax or whether the residue alone should bear the burden.
The court rejected the burden on the residue rule and held that absent
a clearly expressed intent on the part of the testator to the contrary,
Missouri would apply the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
The Missouri Supreme Court was again confronted with the prob-
lem of fixing the tax in Hammond v. Wheeler."' In Hammond, the
surviving widow renounced the will of her deceased husband and
elected to take her statutory share. The issue before the court was
whether the statutory share, to the extent of the "marital deduction,"" 12
should be undiminished by and bear no part of the tax burden. The
court found in favor of the widow's estate (she had subsequently died)
and announced that a spouse's share should not be burdened with the
estate tax to the extent that such share does not exceed the marital de-
duction. " 3 In Carpenter, the surviving spouse was the recipient of non-
probate property and one-third of the residuary estate. However, the
court did not even consider whether the spouse's share should remain
undiminished to the extent of the allowable marital deduction.
This same issue came before the Missouri Supreme Court in Jones
v. Jones. 14 The facts were virtually identical to those in Hammond," 15
but the appellants urged the court to reverse their prior decision. The
110. 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
111. 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961).
112. I.R.C. § 2056.
113. Contra, Banks v. Junk, 264 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1972). (Taxes were deducted prior to
distributing renouncing spouse's share. Therefore, the spouse's share was reduced by the taxes.)
114. 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1964).
115. See text accompanying notes 111-13, supra.
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appellants argued that the surviving spouse, in renouncing the will, was
electing to take by "descent;" and that property taken by "descent" was
subject to payment of the claims of the estate. This argument was re-
jected by the court and they reaffirmed their decision in Hammond,
which exempted recipients of property not generating the taxes.' 16
In re Estate of Wahlin," 7 required the Missouri Court of Appeals
to decide whether the "percentage" bequests to several charitable resid-
uary legatees should be determined before or after payment of the
taxes. The decedent, in his will, made only one specific bequest. The
remainder of his estate was left to his sister, a friend, and numerous
charitable institutions in certain specified percentages of the residuary.
The decedent also owned a substantial amount of property in joint ten-
ancy with his sister and a friend. The issue presented was whether these
percentage residuary bequests should be determined before or after de-
ducting the federal estate tax attributable to property included in the
residuary.
The court declared that the rule in Missouri, as expressed in
Carpenter, is that taxes should be apportioned among all "persons in-
terested in the estate" but only to the extent that the property distrib-
uted generates a part of the tax. Since the charitable bequests did not
generate any estate tax, the court determined that the specified percent-
ages should be applied to the net estate before calculating the federal
estate tax.
Even though the Missouri Supreme Court had established that the
law in that state would require equitable apportionment in 1954,118
questions based on differing factual situations have been raised for al-
most two decades and the later decisions limited the rule of apportion-
ment.ll 9 Such varying circumstances impede the executor from making
an informed decision as to where the law requires the tax burden be
placed.
Ohio
Other state courts have encountered problems similar to those in
Missouri. In 1922, the Ohio Supreme Court supported the burden on
the residuary rule in Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis.'20
However, this court was relying on the then prevailing "misinterpreta-
116. 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961).
117. 505 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App. 1973).
118. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
119. See text accompanying notes 111-17, supra.
120. 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 NE. 114 (1922), afl'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
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tion" of the Code. 21 That is, the idea that Congress intended the estate
taxes be charged to the residuary beneficiaries.
The Ohio Supreme Court was again presented with a federal es-
tate tax apportionment problem in McDougall v. CentralNational Bank
of Cleveland.1 22 The decedent died without making a will but during
her life the decedent had set up a trust (nonprobate property). In
McDougall the court departed from the "burden on the residue" rule
and required contribution from the beneficiary of the trust. Since the
estate did not consist of any specific or general bequests 123 the court did
not define the apportionment scheme in terms of contribution from all
recipients of any property included in the estate, but rather as appor-
tionment between the nonprobate estate and the residue. The reasoning
in this case was that the tax was a common obligation of the benefi-
ciaries and, therefore, "one who pays more than his share of the taxes is
entitled to contribution from those who have not paid their share."' 24
The trustee argued that the trust agreement represented a specific dis-
position of property and, thus, disclosed an intention by the decedent to
transfer the property undiminished by any of the federal estate tax.' 25
The court rejected this argument, stating that, unless there is a clear
expression of intention by a decedent, the courts could not speculate
where the decedent intended the burden of the taxes to rest.
Up to this point, the Ohio rule had moved from burden on the
residuary, whether charitable or otherwise, to apportionment between
the nonprobate estate and the residuary. In 1974, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was faced with apportioning
taxes by applying Ohio law in In re Estate of Penny.126 The estate con-
sisted of specific bequests to the surviving spouse and various charities,
a trust (for the benefit of the surviving spouse and the testator's son)
which was not subject to probate, and a residuary estate which the de-
cedent directed be added to the trust. The court determined that to the
extent that transfers of nonprobate assets do not generate taxes they
should not be diminished by the taxes. Therefore, the wife's share of
the nonprobate assets were not charged with the tax liability. Again, the
Ohio rule was modified. The present result is that the burden is divided
121. See text accompanying notes 26-42, supra.
122. 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
123. By definition an intestate estate cannot contain any specific or general bequests.
124. 157 Ohio St. at 49, 104 N.E.2d at 442.
125. Id. at 48, 104 N.E.2d at 446. (It is ironic that this argument was similar to the justifica-
tion used by the court to distinguish the specific bequest exempted from contribution in Y.M.C.A.
v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922).) See 157 Ohio St. 45, 49, 104 N.E.2d 441, 447
(1952).
126. 504 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1974).
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among the nonprobate and residuary recipients, but if the nonprobate
transferee is the surviving spouse or a charitable institution, that part of
the transfer which does not generate any taxes will not be diminished.
Illinois
Another major problem with judicial determination of tax appor-
tionment is that at a future date the court may reverse a prior deci-
sion. 27 Illinois is an unparalleled example of a state where the method
of distributing the tax has frequently shifted. Until 1974, Illinois was
generally considered one of the states which judicially sanctioned the
burden on the residuary rule.' 28 Then, in 1974, the Appellate Court for
the First District decided the case of In re Estate of Van Duser.129 The
court ordered the surviving joint tenants of certain real property to con-
tribute proportionately with the heirs of the intestate's probate estate.
Later in 1974, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illi-
nois "limited" the application of the rule of equitable contribution in
the case of In re Estate of Fairchild.130 The decedent, Fairchild, specifi-
cally devised certain property to her granddaughter and then desig-
nated others as residuary legatees. However, unlike Van Duser, there
were no nonprobate assets included in the estate. The residuary lega-
tees brought an action against the specific devisee to recover that por-
tion of the estate tax generated by the inclusion of the specific bequest
in the taxable estate.' 3' Distinguishing Van Duser on its facts, the court
determined that the specific devisees should be exempted from contrib-
uting toward the federal estate tax.
Apparently, the law in Illinois was shifting from the "burden on
the residuary" rule to a version of the "equitable apportionment" rule.
Then, in 1976, the Appellate Court for the Third District, in the case of
Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 32 was faced with facts substantially similar to
those of Van Duser. In both Van Duser and Roe, the decedents died
intestate and the gross estate of each decedent included nonprobate
property. However, the ruling in Roe was contrary to the decision in
127. In 4moskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 A. 786
(1938), the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that "the doctrine of stare decisis is not one to
be either rigidly applied or blindly followed." Ironically, this case overruled the prior decision in
Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 A. 308 (1918), which equitably apportioned the burden among all
of the "persons interested in the estate," by relying upon the interpretation of the Code which was
declared erroneous by the United States Supreme Court in Riggs, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
128. See In re Estate of Philips, 1 11. App. 3d 813, 275 N.E.2d 685 (1971).
129. 19 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1974).
130. 21 11. App. 3d 459, 315 N.E.2d 658 (1974).
131. Id.
132. 42 IlI. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344 (1976).
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Van Duser, and the residuary was directed to bear all of the tax bur-
den, thus exempting the recipients of the nonprobate property from
contribution.
In 1978 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision
in Roe 133 and stated that the rule in Illinois is equitable apportionment
between the nonprobate estate and the intestate estate.134 The only is-
sue presented by the facts of this case, was whether the tax should be
apportioned between the recipients of nonprobate property and the in-
testate estate or be charged only to the intestate estate. Since the estate
of an intestate by definition will not contain any specific or general
bequests, charitable or otherwise, and in this case there was no surviv-
ing spouse, the issue was very narrow. Because the supreme court ruled
on only the issue presented by the facts, the law in Illinois concerning
apportionment within the probate estate is still uncertain.135
These three states, Missouri, Ohio and Illinois, are not the only
states which have been burdened with the task of apportioning taxes. 136
The problems are, however, representative of the problems encoun-
tered by those states without apportionment statutes.
STATUTORY EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT: THE BETTER APPROACH
The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act 137 was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Bar Association in 1958. This Act has been adopted
133. Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).
134. Id.
135. On February 17, 1978, less than one month after the Illinois Supreme Court filed its
decision in Roe, the United States Court of Claims was confronted with the problem of applying
Illinois law concerning apportionment in Farley v. United States, No. 423-72 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 17,
1978). This case was primarily concerned with whether the amount paid to the surviving spouse in
settlement of a dispute over the proper method of computation of her statutory share qualified for
the estate tax marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code. In order to answer this ques-
tion it was necessary for the court of claims to first determine whether in Illinois a surviving
spouse's statutory share is calculated before or after the federal estate tax. The court of claims
concluded that in light of Roe and equitable principles, the Illinois Supreme Court would more
likely determine that the statutory share is calculated before subtracting the federal estate tax from
the probate estate.
This decision will inevitably give rise to future litigation on the topic of calculation of the
spouse's forced share in Illinois since a court of claims decision interpreting state law is not bind-
ing on the state courts. In view of the fact that the decedent cannot direct the method for deter-
mining the spouse's statutory share, this present uncertainty in Illinois law can only be remedied
by the state legislature or the state supreme court.
136. Compare Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963) with Adams v.
Adams, 261 N.C. 342, 134 S.E.2d 633 (1964) and Park v. Carroll, 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d 40
(1973); and compare Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963) with In re Estate of Garcia,
9 Ariz. App. 587, 455 P.2d 269 (1969).
137. 8 Uniform LawsAnnotated (Master Edition) 169-79 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as
the 1958 Act].
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in five states. 38 In 1964 two substantive changes were made to the 1958
Act. 139 The revised Act has been adopted in seven states. 40
Except to the extent of the revisions in federal estate taxation
brought about by the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 14 1 the Revised Act is a
comprehensive solution to the federal estate tax apportionment prob-
lem. This Act apportions the taxes among all interested persons but
provides that any allowance or deduction or credit under the Internal
Revenue Code should inure to the benefit of the respective person or
interest. 42 Thus, for example, the surviving spouse is charged with a
portion of the tax only to the extent that the value of the transfer ex-
ceeds the allowable marital deduction.143 This is also true, to the extent
of the deduction provided, for a charitable institution, 44 and for an
orphaned minor child of the decedent. 45 In addition this Act provides
that any credit for state death taxe§ should inure to the benefit of the
person charged with such taxes. 146
The Revised Act also provides for apportionment of penalties and
interest incurred because of a delay in payment of the taxes. 147 How-
ever, the Act provides that if the probate court determines that such
apportionment of the interest or penalty would be inequitable, it may
direct apportionment in the manner it finds equitable. 48 This might
occur, for instance, if one of the persons interested in the estate unrea-
sonably delayed payment of the taxes and thus caused a penalty to be
assessed against the estate.
Each of the problems discussed in the previous section 49 would
have been resolved under the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act.
138. ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 720.11 (1968); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 88-A (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16 (1976) (repealed and replaced by the
Revised Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1964); Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977).
139. 8 Uniform Laws Annotated (Master Edition) 159-67 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as
the Revised Act]. The two major changes were 1) the addition of a subsection to section 3 which
provides for apportionment of the expenses incurred by the estate in connection with the determi-
nation of the tax and its apportionment and 2) the addition of the last sentence to section 8 which
eliminates the necessity of federal participation in the validity of the reciprocity provisions. Com-
missioners' Prefatory Note at 158.
140. HAW. REV. STAT. § 236A-1 (1976); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 2001 (1965) (repealed by L. 1969 ch.
97, § 1); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.303 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-23.1-1 (Supp, 1977); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 7301 (Supp. 1977),
141. Tax Reform Act of 1976, §§ 2001-2209 (1976) (now I.R.C. §§ 2001-2209).
142. Revised Act § 5.
143. Id. at § 5(b) and 5(e).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at § 5(d).
147. Id. at § 2.
148. Id. at § 3(b).
149. See text accompanying notes 105-33, supra.
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However, the changes in the Internal Revenue Code arising out of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 may result in new issues for the courts and the
legislatures to consider. 50 Notwithstanding these new problems, it is
imperative that the state legislatures at least provide the answers to the
recurring problems which have burdened the courts for many decades.
This would be accomplished by adoption of a statute similar to the
Revised Uniform Federal Estate Tax Apportionment Act.
CONCLUSION
In 1916, Congress enacted the first federal estate tax. For the next
three decades most jurisdictions placed the burden of these taxes on the
residue of the estate through an erroneous interpretation of two statutes
dealing with the federal estate tax. This interpretation was rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Riggs, which held that state laws
determine what part of an estate should be charged with the ultimate
burden. Since that decision, thirty-five states have legislatively deter-
mined where the burden should be placed, the other fifteen states leave
the decision to the state courts. As long as these decisions are left to the
courts, conflicts may arise.
Those states which do not have statutes directing the placement of
the burden of the federal estate tax should note that the same confusion
created in Missouri, Ohio and Illinois, and the continuing need for ju-
dicial determination on this matter could be avoided through legisla-
tive action. The federal estate tax was instituted over sixty years ago
but in many states the law concerning payment of this tax is still unset-
tled.
The legislature could solve the problem once and for all by enact-
ing a statute for "equitable apportionment." The testator may direct
that payment of taxes be deducted from the residue of the estate; but
without this type of instruction, all who share in the estate should also
share in the tax burden created by their portion of the estate.
GAIL D. POTYSMAN
150. Some of the problems which may require additional state determination are the "gener-
ation-skipping tax" (I.R.C. §§ 2601-22) and the unified credit for estate and gift taxes (I.R.C.
2010, 2012, 2505).
